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Due to the prevailing threat of terrorism both internationally and within the UK, the 
British government has recently redeveloped the CONTEST strategy for countering 
international terrorism into a new and robust form known as CONTEST2. As part of this 
strategy, the UK government is encouraging those responsible for the protection of the 
public and ensuring the resilience of public buildings and crowded public areas to 
incorporate Counter-Terrorism (CT) measures where appropriate.  However, it is apparent 
that there has been a lack of investment and ‘buy in’ from some key stakeholders.  This is 
due largely to: client scepticism about the use of obtrusive, highly visible and unattractive 
solutions; a lack of informed guidance; differing opinions on the severity of the perceived 
threat from terrorism; and poor awareness of the cost-benefits of such measures. The 
outputs from a two year project, that has utilised a pluralistic methodology, are presented 
in the form of a web-based Decision Support Framework (DSF). The DSF has been 
developed by three English universities in collaboration with the British security services.  
The main purpose is to ensure that good practice in the design of effective and acceptable 
resilient public places can be more widely adopted. The DSF achieves this by providing 
individuals involved with the planning, design, construction, operation and management 
of public places with informed guidance on the necessity and use of CT measures; and 
supporting their operational activities towards the structured and proportionate integration 
of CT solutions into the varied design, build, operation and management processes. An 
evaluation of the DSF suggests that it promotes the innovation of passive and more 
acceptable CT measures, whilst simultaneously maintaining public safety.  This greatly 
promotes the equal weighing of total expected benefits of CT measures against the total 
expected costs.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Mitigating for an array of traditional and unconventional terrorist threats is increasingly 
germane to the way towns and cities are designed and managed; and how built 
environment professionals attempt to enhance levels of safety in urban areas. This is 
particularly the case with regard to public places such as public shopping areas and sports 
stadia, as well as on transit systems such as bus, light-rail or tram, which can be 
particularly vulnerable targets for terrorist attack. It has been argued by Coaffee et al. 
(2008) that for this to be successful, inter-disciplinary and innovative solutions are 
required for a wide range of public, private and community stakeholders that are (or 
should be) involved with the planning, design, construction, operation and management 
of public places. However, Counter-Terrorism (CT) measures may be considered unduly 
obtrusive and seen to promote paranoia and fear amongst the general public.  In order to 
achieve wider scale acceptability, stakeholders need to promote innovative design and 
build solutions away from typical views of CT measures that can encourage speculation, 
scepticism and limited buy-in.  The research reported in this paper argues that due to 
contemporary terrorist threats and tactics, counter-terrorism in urban areas should 
increasingly seek to hybridise hard and soft engineering solutions in order to design and 
manage the built environment in ways which can reduce the occurrence or impact of a 
terrorist attack. In light of these considerations, the outputs from a two year project are 
presented in the form of a web-based decision support framework (DSF). This tool, which 
has been developed in collaboration with the universities of Birmingham and Sheffield 
and the British Security Services, seeks to ensure good practice and innovation in the 
design of effective and acceptable resilient public places. 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The provenance of how the built environment, cities and critical infrastructure have been 
protected from the wide range of hazards and threats can be traced back to the earliest 
civilisations. Coaffee (2003) and Briggs (2005) highlight that since civilisations were 
formed, defences against hazards and threats have dramatically influenced the structure 
and landscape of cities.  In particular, authorities have tried to secure their interests by 
keeping out or controlling the movement of undesirables and creating feelings of safety 
and security amongst the general populations. In the present context, resilience against an 
array of traditional and unconventional terrorist threats is increasingly important to the 
way towns and cities are designed and managed and how built environment professionals 
attempt to enhance levels of community safety (Bosher et al. 2007). 
 
Terrorist methods 
Terrorism is a strategy employed by politically motivated groups to create fear.  These 
strategies typically involve the use, or threat, of physical violence to influence the 
political behaviour of a “Target” group (Neumann and Smith 2008). In essence, terrorist 
methods should be viewed strategically. Different types of attack and targets are chosen 
by individuals, groups, organisations and networks, based on perceptions of their target’s 
weaknesses. The aim is to exploit these perceived weaknesses through symbolic acts of 
violence.  
There have been a wide range of methods used by terrorist organisations, such as the use 
of improvised bombs (in various guises), assassinations of key political figures and 
kidnapping. However, the most common method employed by terrorist groups in recent 
years has been Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs, also known as 
car- or truck-bombs). Employing VBIEDs to attack targets can be an attractive option for 
terrorist groups, as they are mobile and capable of causing significant damage or a large 
number of casualties. Other methods of attacks, such as the use of Person Borne 
Improvised Explosive Devices (PBIED), such as those used in the London bombings in 
July 2007, have also become more widespread in recent years.  However, the VBIED has, 
perhaps, been the most likely device used by groups and networks to cause mass 
casualties and is therefore the focus of counter terrorism measures considered within this 
paper.   
Threats to Crowded Public Places 
 
Terrorist methods and targets have been known to change over time. Traditionally, terror 
groups and/or networks have chosen to attack targets due to a certain cachet – in which 
case such targets may be symbolic, iconic or emblematic sites. However the emphasis has 
now shifted, and in recent years attacks against ‘crowded public places’ have become an 
aim of some groups and networks involved in terrorism (Home Office 2009).   According 
to the British Government (Home Office 2009),  public targets include Bars, Pubs and 
Night Clubs; Restaurants and Hotels; Shopping Centres; Sports and Entertainment Stadia; 
Cinemas and Theatres; Visitor Attractions; Major Events; Commercial Centres; Health 
sector; Education sector; Religious sites/places of worship; and, Transportation hubs 
(such as rail and bus stations). This  targeting of  ‘soft’ (non-military) targets, has 
resulting in a number of large-scale terrorist attacks such as New York (2001), 
Casablanca (2003), Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2003 and 2008) to name 
a few. These crowded public places are typified by mass public congregations/congestion, 
lack of inherent security and protection.   
 
Although debates continue about the relationship between new and traditional threats, the 
methods and tactics adopted by terror groups tend to be novel, innovative and 
increasingly focused on sites that will lead to mass casualties; or on multiple coordinated 
attacks for a similar impact. Typically these crowded areas have features in common such 
as their lack of access control, but may be bounded (e.g. a stadium or train) or unbounded 
(e.g. a shopping area).  Such attacks and targeting have led to a considerable amount of 
research interest, and there has been an increase in taking on multi-disciplinary 
approaches that can be paramount to developing strategies to maintain community safety 
and deterring terrorism in public places, while simultaneously ensuring acceptability of 
the measures in the public eye. 
 
Current Counter-Terrorism Methods in Public Places – A British Perspective 
The CONTEST strategy was developed and made publicly available in 2006 and updated 
in 2009 (HM Government 2009).  Contributing factors to the public dissemination of the 
CONTEST strategy included corporate concern that there was no national threat warning 
system or publicly available counter-terrorism strategy (Gregory 2007). Nicoli and 
Johnstone (2009: 1) summarise the strategy’s aims, which are based on four pillars of 
action, as follows: “Pursue terrorists with the aim of bringing them to justice and 
stopping attacks; Prevent the next generation of political terrorists from coming into 
being by combating the ideology which might produce them; Protect against the threat of 
terrorism by taking a range of protective security measures; and, Prepare for the 
inevitability of an attack by optimising national resilience capabilities”. CONTEST has 
major implications for the design, construction and operation of the built environment, as 
the ‘Protect’ strand states that in regard to the built environment, crowded places are at 
greatest risk from being the target of terrorist attacks.  Therefore, the protection of 
crowded public places is perceived to be one of the most important priorities for security 
services and policy makers (Coaffee et al. 2008), part of which involves the use of 
specific products and measures to reduce the impact an attack could have and/or stop a 
certain method of attack completely, which can involve the design and adaptation of the 
environment, surroundings and structures.   
A wide range of measures are used to counter the threat of terrorism in urban areas, 
utilising both ‘hard’ measures, such as engineering, and ‘soft’ measures, such as the 
management of space (Coaffee et al. 2008).  The aim of such measures, therefore, are to 
create an environment that is difficult for terrorists to attack, is protective of its 
population and assets and is resilient to the consequences should an attack occur 
(Grosskopf 2006). Grosskopf (2006: 1) defines counter-terrorism methods (CTMs) as 
“those physical, technological and operational measures intended to devalue, deter, deny 
and defend against acts of terrorism”. Stand-off, which is the distance between a potential 
target and an explosive device, is considered the most effective CTM against a vehicle-
borne explosive device (Little 2004; Kemp 2007), due to the levels of energy created by 
an explosive device decreasing rapidly per cube of distance (Little 2004), meaning that as 
the distance increases, levels of damage decrease significantly. Where stand-off cannot be 
achieved, which is highly likely in sites or structures  that have already been developed in 
urbanised areas, other CTMs are available and can include and are not limited to: 
 Providing perimeter fencing. 
 Installing parking security safeguards for both employees and delivery persons. 
 Purchasing on-site surveillance cameras. 
 Using landscaping and vertical impediments to preclude vehicles from getting close to 
the site. 
 Obtaining some type of employee identification recognition process. 
 Using security guards to protect the facility against possible purposeful human 
wrongdoing Kemp (2007: 617). 
 
Figure 1: Example of unattractive ‘stand-off’ barriers used in central London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nicoli and Johnstone (2009) acknowledge that whilst the range of CTMs that are used is 
fairly small and the promotion of their use is widely publicised, vast criticism of their 
need, use, cost, aesthetic appearance (see Figure 1) and other factors cause concern that 
need analysing in greater detail.  What is also constantly alluded to in the academic and 
policy literature is the need to balance higher levels of security with concerns for the 
functionality of places (Coaffee et al. 2008). As resilient planning and design continues to 
evolve what is required are increasingly inter-professional solutions and an 
interdisciplinary perspective that can integrate effective and acceptable counter-terrorist 
innovations into the design of public places.  
 
 
POTENTIAL FOR INNOVATION IN AEC 
 
It is argued that terrorism and the methods that terrorists use will always be innovative, in 
order to increase their chances of causing as much harm and fear as possible (Briggs 
2005).  There is no logic, necessarily, in repeatedly attacking a particular target, or a 
specific type of target, as the levels of preparedness, planning and security in relation to a 
terrorist attack will be significantly higher, most likely, following the first attack.   
Therefore, it could be argued that the innovation of terrorists will need to be bettered by 
the innovations of those attempting to counter terrorism.  
The role of counter terrorism should be a shared responsibility across the professional 
domains; nonetheless, from an architectural, engineering and construction (AEC) 
perspective, Bosher et al. (2007) argue that there are a number of key actions that can be 
undertaken to address systems in the built environment that are at risk from threats such 
as terrorism. These actions are categorised as broadly relating to: innovation and 
knowledge (transdisciplinary training and hazard awareness); operations (information 
exchanges between a wide range of stakeholders such as planners, designers, engineers 
and the emergency and security services); planning (well designed and suitable 
locations); and legislation and regulatory incentives (building codes and good practice 
guidance). It has been argued that innovations for CT in public places can include a 
number of issues, such as incorporating CT into sustainable urbanism (Coaffee and 
Bosher 2008), the ‘branding’ of security (Coaffee and Rodgers 2008), the dual use of CT 
measures, related to natural hazard mitigation (see Coaffee and Bosher 2008) and even 
how to sensitively incorporate CT for heritage sites (Benton-Short 2007). Recent 
innovations in the field of CTMs have included: collapsible pavements (strong enough to 
bear the weight of pedestrians but not large vehicles); large but reconfigurable planters; 
and an ever widening range of blast resistant materials and cladding. However, for this 
type of innovation to be expanded, Coaffee et al. (2008) suggest that a framework is 
required to help construction and non-construction stakeholders to devise and integrate 
innovative counter-terrorism methods during the earliest planning and design stages (of 
new projects and retrofits).  Accordingly, the research reported in this paper proposes an 
innovative decision support tool to inform and guide stakeholders and decision makers in 
their assessment of appropriate and proportionate measures to counter-terrorism.  
 
 
 
DECISION SUPPORT FOR CT DESIGN 
 
The RE-Design Decision Support Framework (DSF) has been developed by the 
universities of Loughborough, Birmingham and Sheffield as a project-focused tool that 
can help a range of key decision makers to consider the proportionate use of CTMs in 
new and existing developments.  The focus of the tool in application is on crowded public 
places which are regarded as anywhere in, or adjacent to, locations to which large 
amounts of the general public have access. This web-based tool has been developed with 
the assistance of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and the 
National Counter-Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). By raising awareness of terrorist 
threats and the implications of such threats in a proportionate manner, this web-based tool 
helps project decision makers in developing a suitable design and construction strategy. 
The tool has been designed for a wide range of users (i.e. technical/project managers, risk 
assessors, architects, designers, chief engineers) and in a way that allows 
recommendations to be produced within a short period of time. This tool has been 
developed to encourage more joined-up thinking in relation to how the built environment 
is designed, built and operated, and will therefore complement broader frameworks such 
as ISO14001 (International Environmental Management Standard), ISO2600 (Social 
Responsibility) and BS 25999-1:2006 (Business continuity management: Code of 
practice). However, it has been developed to represent a contingent tool which can be 
appropriated and applied to a variety of different situations and contexts. A summary of 
the process will now be discussed.  
 
Threat identification 
A threat assessment will typically consider a range of threats (i.e., criminal, terrorist, etc.) 
for a given development/location (new build or retrofit). The assessment would examine 
supporting information to evaluate the likelihood of occurrence for each type of threat. 
Threat identification through a threat and risk assessment will help identify the 
vulnerabilities and levels of security required. Integrating security needs within the 
original design allows for the optimal use of resources, and early consideration of the 
most appropriate solutions, considering factors such as location, operational risk, 
underground services, aesthetics and other practicalities. Integrating security and counter 
terrorism measures can prove to be considerably less expensive if incorporated into the 
original design of a development, rather than retrofitted at a later stage. However, at 
whatever stage physical security needs are assessed, it is important that the various 
stakeholders are consulted as to the most appropriate and cost-effective solution to the 
security needs.  Information associated with details of terrorist threats will typically be 
security restricted. However, in the UK it is possible to access this sensitive information 
from Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) that are located within the 
intelligence services of regional police constabularies. CTSAs can also provide 
construction professionals with advice on whether counter-terrorism measures should be 
adopted and what types of measures could be used (see Harre-Young et al. 2009).   
 
Implications of the Threat(s) (vulnerabilities) 
Once the credible threats are identified, a vulnerability assessment should be performed. 
The vulnerability assessment can be a relatively simple process that considers the 
potential impact of specific threats as well as the vulnerability of the building/site. Impact 
of loss is the degree to which the operation of the building/site could be impaired by the 
impact of a given threat.  A key component of the vulnerability assessment is properly 
defining the ratings for impact of loss and vulnerability. These definitions may vary 
greatly from building to building. For example, the amount of time for which capability is 
impaired is an important part of impact of loss. If the facility being assessed is a major 
component of critical infrastructure, a downtime of a few minutes may be a serious 
impact of loss, while for a travel agent’s office a downtime of a few minutes could be 
quite minor. Bosher et al. (2009) have devised a set of generic ‘impact of loss’ definitions 
that have been adapted for the RE-Design tool, these are: 
 Devastating: The building/site is damaged/contaminated beyond habitable use.  Most 
items/assets are lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond repair/restoration.  
 Severe: The building/site is partially damaged/contaminated. Some items/assets in the 
building are damaged beyond repair, but the building/site remains mostly intact. The 
building/site may be closed for a period of up to 2 weeks or a portion of the 
building/site may be closed for an extended period of time (more than one month).  
 Noticeable: The building/site is temporarily closed or unable to operate, but can 
continue without an interruption of more than one day. A limited number of assets 
may be damaged, but the majority of the building/site is not affected.  
 Minor: The building/site experiences no significant impact on operations (downtime 
is less than four hours) and there is no loss of major assets. 
 
Vulnerability is defined here (after Bosher et al. 2009) to be a combination of the 
exposure of the building/site to threats and the level of deterrence and/or defence 
provided by the existing countermeasures. In the context of terrorism, the exposure of the 
building/site to an attack is determined by a number of factors, such as the likelihood of 
an attack (based on information provided by the security services) and the extent to which 
the asset or facility is protected from an attack. Sample definitions for vulnerability 
ratings are as follows: 
 High: The building/site would be highly vulnerable to a terrorist attack  
 Moderate: The building/site would be moderately vulnerable to a terrorist attack 
 Low: The building/site would have low vulnerability to a terrorist attack  
 
Risk Analysis 
Once an assessment has been made, a combination of the impact of loss rating and the 
vulnerability rating (in consultation with leading government agencies and stakeholders) 
can be used to evaluate the potential risk to the facility from a given threat. An example 
of a risk matrix is depicted in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Example of matrix used to identify levels of risk 
Level of vulnerability 
Impact of loss High Moderate Low 
Devastating H H M 
Severe H M L 
Noticeable M M L 
Minor M L L 
 
The risk ratings illustrated in Table 1 can be interpreted as follows: 
 H - Risks are high. Counter-terrorism measures are recommended to mitigate these 
risks and these should be implemented in a proportionate manner as soon as possible. 
 M - Risks are moderate. Counter-terrorism measures could be important to the long-
term sustainability of the development and are recommended. 
 L - Risks are low. Counter-terrorism measures may enhance security and contribute 
towards ‘future proofing’ but are not essential. 
 
If a 'high' or 'moderate' risk has been identified it is advisable to consult with the lead 
Government agencies responsible for dealing with the specific aspects of the threat, such 
as mitigation and preparedness (details of these agencies are provided on the project 
website www.resilientdesign.co.uk). Users would need to consider the implications of the 
terrorist threats in a number of ways because such threats can have far reaching impacts 
upon the operations of construction companies, the structural and materials requirements, 
associated infrastructure, the project's neighbours and the local community. 
 
Upgrade Options/Recommendations 
Based on the findings from the risk analysis, the next step in the process is to identify 
CTMs that can lower the various levels of risk. If minimum standard CTMs for a given 
facility level are not currently present, these should automatically be included in the 
upgrade recommendations. Additional CTM upgrades above the minimum standards 
should be recommended as necessary to address the specific threats identified for the 
facility. The estimated installation and operating costs for the recommended CTMs will 
need to be considered but also the possible long-term benefits of using such measures.  
 
Studies on the cost effectiveness and return ratios of investments related to mitigating 
crime and natural hazards have been carried out and can offer an insight into the long-
term benefits of proactively considering CTMs.  For example, Armitage (2000) showed 
that in regard to mitigating crime in residential properties, designing in and retrofitting 
measures cost 26% and 36% respectively of the average cost of a burglary in the UK. 
With regard to the study of natural hazards, research into Federal Emergency 
Management Agency grants by the Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) showed that 
for every dollar that was spent on mitigation, society saved $4 in the event of a disaster or 
a hazard causing damage. Benefits of adopting CTMs in the design stage of a project 
could include reduced insurance premiums, reduced maintenance costs and reduced 
service disruptions in the event of a terrorist attack. Williams et al. (2000) highlighted the 
implications for those that do not take such action by showing that within two months of 
the Manchester city centre bombing in 1996, the loss of turnover from local businesses 
was estimated at £50 million and the subsequent rebuilding programme cost over £500 
million. To date insufficient research has been conducted on the costs and benefits of 
incorporating CT measures, but it is clear that it would nonetheless be prudent to adopt a 
long-term view of any initial additional costs and how they could be recouped (Harre-
Young et al. 2009). 
 
The implementation of the recommended security, design and/or structural upgrades 
should have a positive effect on the impact of loss and/or the vulnerability ratings for 
each threat. The final step in the process is to re-evaluate these two ratings for each threat 
in light of the recommended upgrades. Using a car bomb as an example, the installation 
of blast protection/resilience measures (i.e. the use of laminated glass and blast proof 
cladding) will not prevent a bomb blast from occurring, but would reduce the damage 
caused to the target. Therefore, in this case the impact of loss rating would improve, but 
the vulnerability rating would stay the same. 
 
The final component of the toolkit is the 'Action plan', a project-specific report that can be 
used by clients or other interested parties to demonstrate that CTMs have been considered 
(even if it is merely demonstrating that terrorism did not actually pose a threat). The 
‘Action Plan’ is a brief, printed outline of the key actions and issues that should be 
considered prior to, and during, the construction project. This action plan should ideally 
be reviewed at each stage of the design, construction and operation process and upon 
completion of the project the 'Action Plan' can be included in the project's legacy archive. 
 
Validation of the tool 
The on-line version of the RE-Design toolkit is being validated by a range of construction 
and security stakeholders. Once this process has been completed the toolkit will be 
revised (if necessary) and launched nationally in March 2010. The toolkit will be free and 
publicly accessible to use, merely requiring the users to register their details.  The toolkit 
provides the user with a simple interface to guide them in their decision making with 
additional guidance documentation and internet links to supporting information as a key 
component.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the threat of terrorism that exists within the UK and internationally, the British 
government is encouraging those responsible for the protection and resilience of public 
buildings and crowded areas to incorporate the use of CTMs where appropriate.  While 
there have been a number of innovative CTMs there is arguably scope for more to be 
achieved. There is also scope for those who plan, design, build and manage crowded 
public areas to become more proactive in initiatives to counter the threats of terrorism.  
The web-based tool represents an innovative approach to meeting these objectives 
encouraging good practice in the design of resilient public places and the incorporation of 
effective and acceptable CTMs. By informing the decision-making processes of key 
stakeholders that are involved with the planning, design, construction, operation and 
management of crowded public places, opportunities for CTM innovations are more 
likely to emerge. It is therefore anticipated that AEC professionals will view the required 
innovations as opportunities to become leaders in the fields of CT and security design, 
resilient engineering, and public safety (amongst many others). 
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